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In early 2007, Nepal’s hitherto sleepy Terai region became the
epicenter of its continuing political turbulence. The Seven Party Alliance
(SPA) of pro-democracy parties and the hitherto insurgent Maoists, known
as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) had signed a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. As the two
sides were forging a governing partnership, the country’s Terai region,
home to almost half of Nepal’s population, was threatened by a violent
movement that quickly engulfed the entire region. What had started as a
protest against the exclusion of vital Madhesi issues (federalism,
proportional representation etc.) from the just promulgated Interim
Constitution turned into a massive rebellion resulting in the deaths of
dozens of protesters. Spearheaded by a little known Madhesi civil society
organization, the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF), the movement
showed resilience and ferocity. First denounced by the SPA government
and the Maoists as foreign-inspired and regressive, the government had to
quickly accept many of the Madhesi demands.
To date the Madhesi movement has several accomplishments to its
credit. Thanks to this movement, federalism and regional autonomy have
become central to the state restructuring, the victims of Madhesi protests
have officially been recognized as martyrs, and the Madhesi parties gained
the fourth and fifth positions in the Constituent Assembly Elections of
April 2008, with important role in the volatile coalitional politics of the
country. Never before had the Madhesi parties have so many seats in the
national legislature. The Madhesi leaders since have occupied high profile
positions: President, Vice-President, and, for a time the Foreign Minister.
As Shahdevan (2003) points out, ethnic conflicts in South Asia tend to
fester into “major wars marked by heavy loss of lives and destruction of
property.” The success of Nepal’s Madhesis in quickly ascending to
power positions is an anomaly. Although the jury is still out on the longer
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term trajectory of this movement, its achievements are noteworthy. How
definitive is the success of the Madhesi movement and how does one
explain its course? What was the nature of the Madhesi uprising? Has
there been a real shift in the attitude of Nepali elites toward the Madhesi
issues? Are the Madhesi issues likely to be resolved peacefully? Many
such questions about the Madhesi movement remain still unanswered.
During my field study in Nepal in July-August 2010, I posed some of
these questions to numerous Madhesi politicians, civil society leaders and
ordinary citizens. My paper combines my field study observations with
scholarly research to examine the dynamics of Madhesi movement.
Madhesis and the paradox of their marginalization in Nepal
The Madhesis constitute 33 percent of the total population; however,
Madhesi leaders have blamed the census for under recording the Madhesi
population. They claim this percentage is well above 40 percent. Yet,
defining a Madhesi is problematic. Excepting a minority of people
indigenous to the region, people from both north and South (India)
migrated into the Terai. It is in view of such migration pattern that Gaige
(1975) called Terai as “geographically and culturally a transitional region
between the hills and the plains (p. 11).” The only clear marker of
Madhesis is their mother tongues, which are part of one of what Gaige
calls “the plains language category.” This category includes Hindi, Urdu,
Maithili, Bhojpuri, Bengali, the dialects of these languages such as
Awadhi, and Morang Pradesh dialects and languages spoken by relatively
few people such as Jhangar, Marwari, and Raji (p. 15). Lacking any other
distinct socio-cultural markers as a group, the Madhesis clearly lack what
Weber (1994) regarded as key elements of a nation, “common descent and
homogeneity (p. 22).” How did the Madhesis unite to launch a powerful
protest movement? How did the term Madhesi become a rallying factor?
Exclusion is the key to understanding the formation of Madhesi
identity. The history of this exclusion began with the formation of modern
Nepal as a nation in 1769. Gaige (1975) highlights this when he writes,
“hill people were given preference over plains people settled in the Tarai,
so that the plains people were relegated to a second-class status.” For
example, in the pre-1950 period, Madhesis needed passports to travel to
the capital, Kathmandu. Discrimination against the plains people
continued in the post 1950 era by “making the acquisition of citizenship
more difficult for people of plains origin living in the Tarai (Gaige, 1975,
p. 87-88).” Rajendra Mahato, a leader of Terai-based Nepal Sadbhavana
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Party, highlights the discrimination in these words: The Terai people were
alienated from the national bureaucracy, politics, army, civil service, etc.
No more than five percent Teraians were represented in the police. No
Teraians were represented at all in the army. And in bureaucracy itself,
despite their population, less than five percent people were represented. So
there was also imbalance in national politics and bureaucracy. There also
was no adequate representation of Terai people in the parliament and
politics. Even for the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections we are
demanding that a proportional representation of the Terai people be
accepted in candidature or membership of the political parties.8
Nepal’s Madhesi nationalism supports Beissinger (1996)’s assertion
that “nationalism achieves political potency only in the form of collective
discourse, mass mobilization or state practice (p. 100).” Following
multiparty democracy since 1990 various groups engaged in identity
movements. However, as Lawoti (2008) finds, the representation of many
underrepresented groups, including that of Madhesis, really declined
during the democratic era of 1990-2002.
The 2007 Movement and Its Achievements
As Varshney (2002) has pointed out, protests are more likely in
democratic polities (p. 24-25). Madhesi movement erupted against the
backdrop of the successful April Movement, which for Madhesis had
bitter ironies. The future trajectory of the Madhesi movement will also be
largely contingent upon the fate of Nepal’s still shaky political transition.
The immediate spark for the Madhesi protests was provided by the
promulgation of the Interim Constitution on January 15. The Interim
Constitution was drafted exclusively by the members of the SPA and
Maoists; the Madhesi leaders were left out. On January 16, 2007, the
supporters of the MPRF showed their opposition to the promulgation of
the constitution by burning its copies on the streets of Kathmandu. They
opposed the constitution for omitting any reference to a federal structure
and proportional electoral system. The government’s effort to suppress the
movement failed and the movement spread quickly to most parts of the
plain region; security forces killed dozens of protesters.
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The Madhesi movement came in the wake of some critical
developments. The Madhesi leaders found the peace deal with the Maoists
as accentuating their marginalization. According to a highly placed
political analyst, Madhesi leaders’ insignificant role in the drafting of the
interim constitution followed a unified rejection by the major political
parties of their demand for the reconfiguration of electoral districts on the
universally recognized basis of population. Moreover, concessions to the
Maoists had raised serious Madhesi objections. For example, the Asian
Center for Human Rights (2009) reported Madhesi militants asking if the
Maoists could pick up the gun and become members of parliament, why
they could not do the same (p. 5). Madhesi land owners suspected that the
Maoists would grab more of their land to redistribute to their supporters,
mostly the hill migrants. A badly handled riot in the western Nepali town
of Nepalganj in the plain region on December 25-26, 2006 was another
prelude to the movement. Sparked by confrontations between the
supporters of the Madhes based Nepal Sadbhavana Party and those of the
SPA, the riots’ victims were disproportionately Madhesis. A report by the
People’s Level Civil Investigation Committee consisting of human rights
groups found only 14 percent of the property destroyed in the riot
belonged to the Pahadis. The most damaging for the government was the
allegation that it abandoned what Esman (2004) would call “any pretense
of impartiality in the face of ethnic disputes (p. 16).” The Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR) in a press
release on October 22, 2007 also noted the accusation of “police acting
partially” in Nepalganj agitations and in other Madhesi agitations in the
months of January and February 2007. The government is yet to release
the findings of an official investigation into the Nepalganj riot.
From confrontation to compromise: How real a turnaround?
The government was challenged by both pressures from the streets and
a lack of any international support for its preferred policy of dealing
forcefully with the Madhesi protests. Nepal government pointed fingers at
the Indian indifference to the activities of Madhesi militants from across
the borders and sought Indian assistance in restoring normalcy in the plain
region. To Kathmandu’s disappointment, however, New Delhi urged the
government to resolve Madhesis’ “genuine grievances.” A well informed
source told me that India cautioned Nepal against using military to
suppress the Madhesis by warning that it could create East Pakistan type
situation that resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan and in creation of
Bangladesh in 1971.
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Still, the government only moved very slowly and hesitantly in making
any concessions to the Madhesi leaders. Each round of concessions also
marked a different stage for the Madhesi movement. The first such
concession came through Prime Minister Girija P. Koirala’s address to the
nation on February 9, 2007, which included the guarantee of a federal
system after the CA election, a mixed-proportional electoral system, and a
reconstitution of election constituencies in the Terai based on population.
In response, the MPRF called off its strike but its protests continued
demanding the resignation of the Home Minister, who the Madhesi leaders
viewed as conniving with the Maoists against the Madhesi interests. These
protests ended in August 2007 when the government agreed to a charter of
22 MPRF demands; the MPRF since has accused the government of nonimplementation of many of these demands.
The Madhesi movement entered another critical phase soon after the
SPA reached a 23-point agreement in December 27, 2007 with the Maoists
to end the Maoists’ boycott of the government and to hold the CA
elections in April 2008. The agreement with the Maoists, however,
accentuated the divide between the Madhesi and Pahadi leaders. The
divide got a boost by the defection from the Nepali Congress of a senior
Madhesi leader, Mahantha Thakur, who formed a new political party, the
Terai-Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP); the party was formed on
December 28, the day after the SPA reached agreement with the Maoists.
The party started off amidst widespread rumor that its formation was
inspired by India as a counterweight to the MPRF.
The rise of a United Madhesi Democratic Front (UMDF) was a
distinctive as well as an intriguing development of this phase of the
Madhesi movement. The Front was formed on February 9 jointly by the
MPRF, the Sadbhavana Party led by Rajendra Mahto, and the newly
formed TMLP in order to galvanize the Madhesis. The Madhesi leaders
deplored the failure of the government in implementing the 22-point
agreement and called for fresh Terai agitation if their demands were not
met by January 19. The UMDF also called for boycotting the CA elections
unless their demands were met. The Madhesi groups also objected to the
deployment of special police force in the Terai (Nepalnews 26 January
2008). The Madhesi protests that followed left the Nepali government
besieged and paralyzed. Widespread disruptions of transport and
communication networks left Kathmandu without supplies, especially of
petroleum products – a déjà vu for the capital’s residents who had seen
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similar shortages resulting from the non-renewal of trade and transit treaty
with India in 1989.
On February 28, the UMDF and the government signed an eight-point
agreement to end the nation-crippling indefinite strike in the Terai.
Interestingly, the agreement was brokered by the outgoing Indian
ambassador S. K. Mukherjee with the last round of negotiations being held
in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. The main stumbling block in the
negotiations was the UMDF’s demand for a single autonomous Madhesh
province stretching from Nepal’s Eastern most to Western most plain
areas with the right to self determination. The agreement remains
controversial to this day. The UMDF leaders claimed that the government
accepted their demand of a single Madhes state whereas the government
leaders sounded vague. Soon after the CA election, differences between
the UMDF and SPA-M (the SPA and Maoist) leaders became more
pronounced. Resentment at India’s role in the negotiations also appeared
widely in the Nepali media. Some observers also noted a direct Indian role
in the formation of the TMLP; yet another evidence of New Delhi’s
increasing reliance on the Madhesi groups against the Maoists in view of
the apparent inability of the SPA parties to resist the Maoist pressure
(Thapa, 2008).
Nepali Politics: The post-CA election scenario
Unlike, Lijphart’s elite consensus-based approach, Nepali elites tend to
favor brinkmanship to advance their interests. Hence, shifting and highly
unpredictable elite interactions have been driven essentially by their
respective electoral, street as well as disruptive capabilities. The Madhesis
are the last to join Nepal’s power circle by using the combination of these
capabilities, first gaining world attention through powerful street protests,
and since the CA elections, by leveraging on their strength in the
assembly. Nepal’s case resonates with Collier (2009)’s generalization
from his broader study of the poorest and conflict prone countries that he
calls the “bottom billion:” Instead of a shared sense of belonging, the state
functions because its component groups are suspicious of each other and
can use the institutions of accountability to prevent being disadvantaged.
Such societies may not be cozy, but they are viable (p. 186).
The Nepali case, however, is more complicated as it lacks any
effective institutions of accountability barring an embattled judiciary
fighting both allegations of massive corruption and attempts by politicians
to undermine its independence. As a result, the ability of domestic
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political actors to build and sustain a functioning state has been severely
compromised leaving both Nepal’s peace process as well as governance in
a state of limbo. Since the ouster of the Maoist-led coalition in May 2009,
Nepali political parties have made very little progress on contentious
issues like the rehabilitation of the Maoist combatants currently housed in
the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) supervised cantonments,
the division of power between the center and the provincial units under the
proposed federal system, the demilitarization of the Maoists if they are to
be part of a democratic process, etc. Unless the political parties reach a
compromise, severe breakdown of the peace process may follow the
termination of UNMIN mission in January 2011; nothing better
exemplifies the political stalemate than the inability of the CA to elect a
Prime Minister after more than sixteen rounds of voting.
Political observers in Nepal hold both positive and negative views of
Nepal’s current political imbroglio. Those on the applauding side view the
current stalemate resulting from many complex issues that Nepali people
and politicians have taken up and are seeking to resolve. They cite major
breakthroughs like the end of the Maoist insurgency, the declaration of
republic, and the massive mobilization of various sections of people for
their fair share in the state restructuring as major cornerstones for Nepal’s
new democracy. The pessimists have no less impressive litany of
concerns. The pessimists are haunted by extreme political uncertainty and
instability, which they consider as pointing strongly to looming state
failure and chaos. Among the factors they blame for producing such a
situation, the Maoists’ indeterminacy tops the list. The pessimists largely
share the view that the Maoists have yet to convince other major political
parties and international forces that their participation in the democratic
process is not just a ploy to advancing their ultimate goal of establishing a
one-party state. This failure, the pessimists point out, has been extremely
counterproductive as it has made all non-Maoist political forces extremely
dependent on Nepali army to defend themselves from feared Maoist
onslaught; the Maoists’ is the only party that has its own army and tens of
thousands of organized, disciplined and armed cadres. Nepali politics,
thus, has come to be fixated on a single political agenda: keep the Maoists
out. Even key foreign players in Nepal, mainly India and the United
States, share and support this agenda of Nepal’s non-Maoist parties, thus,
ossifying a polarization and uncertainty.
There is a general alarm at the risk inherent in this political stalemate.
Prof. Lok Raj Baral, a leading scholar of Nepali politics and the nation’s
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former ambassador to India, described the current situation as the “biggest
crisis in the country’s history.” He saw Nepal as suffering from “total
dependence syndrome” with the state collapse scenario looking “closer
than at any other time.”9 Another leading journalist expressed concern that
Nepal is fast turning into a hotbed of international rivalries, primarily
between India and China, but also as a diplomatic and military listening
post for others.10
Madhesi movement: The road ahead
Madhesi leaders of Nepal consider the current political deadlock as a
major setback to the Madhesi interests. Madhesi leaders regard the
regularization of democratic process with the adoption of a constitution
and the holding of national elections as key to structural reforms that will
address the deep rooted grievances of the Madhesis. However, few of
them are hopeful that this would happen. Madhesi leaders are of the view
that the ruling elites of the major political parties, unsure of how to
accommodate various conflicting demands, including those of the
Madhesis, favor the current stalemate. Even a compromise among the
major political parties, they bemoan, will do little to resolve the Madhesi
issues. They regard the mainstream parties as patently hypocritical; the
major political parties, including the Maoists, oppose the idea of real
decentralization of power under a federal set up. They believe that
Kathmandu elites, overwhelmingly non-Madhesis, crave the now
endangered centralized state that has allowed them to amass enormous
power and wealth. A well connected Nepali scholar deeply involved in the
constitution deliberation process corroborated such Madhesi apprehension
by describing the ruling elites as being in a “state of siege;” their paralysis
is explained by their nostalgia for the past and deep fear of what is to
come. They are taking refuge in the current stalemate to postpone difficult
decisions as long as possible.
The Madhesi leaders’ outlook for the future exudes both confidence
and alarm. Their confidence arises from the success of the Madhesi
mobilization during the movement. The view that Kathmandu’s grip over
Madhesh is a relic not current reality is widely held among Madhesi
leaders and Madhesi population. In the current draft of the interim
constitution this reality has been accepted by division of the Madhes
region into three provinces. Although the projected federal structure does
not meet the demand for a single unified Madhes province, Madhesis,
9
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elites as well as commoners, believe that, 2007 movement was successful
in asserting Madhesi identity. With more around 80 members in
Constituent Assembly and demonstrated disruptive power of Madhes
proven by the 2007 movement, the Madhes has forced itself into the center
stage of Nepali politics.
Yet, the Madhesi leaders are aware that there is no room for
complacency. The benefits of this movement are yet to percolate to the
popular level. Most demands of the Madhesi movement remain
unimplemented. There is growing alienation in the Madhes, especially
among the young Madhesis; Madhesi leaders are increasingly losing their
support and are viewed as typical of Nepal’s “predatory elites,” the main
beneficiaries of political changes. Several Madhesi lawmakers have
expressed fear that another Madhesi movement is already brewing in the
region. Life in the region is bedeviled by complete absence of law and
order, disruption of business and industries and complete breakdown of
institutions of governance and education. Lack of governmental authority
in the region is compounded by corruption in the government and
complicity of public officials and politicians with criminals (Jha, 2008).
Growing power rivalry among the Madhesi parties has compromised
the Madhesi leaders’ ability to unite behind the Madhesi issues. For
example, the MPRF, the largest Madhesi party, has been rocked by
defections and internal squabbles driven more by self interests than by
differences over policies and issues. Reports of disaffection within the
ranks and files with the party leadership’s penchant for power have also
been in the news. In January 2009, for example, a group of 38 out of 52
MJF lawmakers opposed their party members in the government by urging
the Prime Minister to relieve them from their cabinet positions
(Kantipuronline, January 6, 2009). The Madhesi leaders also have to
contend with divisiveness of Madhesi identity from Terai groups that
resent being labeled Madhesi. The Tharu and Muslims, for example, have
engaged in persistent campaigns to protest such labeling and demand
greater representation. In April 2009, the Maoist-led coalition agreed to
address the demands put forth by the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee
(TJSC) to prevent their threatened series of protests. Hence, Madhesi
leadership will have to operate in the context of its own diversity and
cannot, to put it in Gorenberg (2000)’s words understood “entirely at the
level of the whole ethnic group (p. 117).”
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